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This paper addresses the question of existence of a competitive equilibrium in
a Ramsey economy in which di¤erent agents evaluate the future di¤erently and
investment is irreversible. Since we consider an in…nite horizon growth model
the setting is formally for an economy with in…nitely many commodities. Debreu
(1954) was the …rst who extended the equilibrium analysis to such economies.
Following his early work many methods have been used to prove existence of
competitive equilibria in in…nite dimensional spaces: core equivalence (e.g. Peleg
and Yaari (1970)), limit of equilibria of …nite dimensional economies (e.g. Bewley
(1972)), demand approaches (e.g. Florenzano (1983)), Negishi approaches, either
in its topological version (e.g. Magill (1981), Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1997),
Aliprantis, Border, and Burkinshaw (1997)), or in its dual version using the
weight system associated with a Pareto-optimum (e.g. Dana and Le Van (1991),
Kehoe, Levin and Romer (1991), Hadji and Le Van (1994), Dana and Le Van
(2000), Duran and Le Van (2001) ). Aliprantis, Border, and Burkinshaw (1990)
and Becker and Boyd (1997) contain modern expositions of these approaches.
Our strategy for tackling the question of existence relies on exploiting the
link between Pareto-optima and competitive equilibria. In that respect our proof
is in the line of Dana and Le Van (1991), Kehoe, Levin and Romer (1991),
Hadji and Le Van (1994), Duran and Le Van (2001). We …rst study the Pareto-
optimum problem involving individual weights in a social value function. We
next show that with any optimal path (k¤;c¤) one can associate a price system
p for the consumption good and a price r for the initial capital stock such that
(k¤;c¤;p;r) constitute a price equilibrium with transfers. The …nal step to obtain
an equilibrium is to prove that there exists aset of welfare weights such that these
transfers equal to zero. By doing so, we convert the in…nite-dimensional …xed
point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a …nite-dimensional
…xed point problem involving individual weights in a social value function.
Our paper is in the line of Dana and Le Van (1991) for a second aspect: in
our model agents are heterogeneous. But observe that the model in Dana and
Le Van (1991) is more complicated with many sectors and recursive preferences.
In our model individuals’ preferences are additively separable and there is one
sector. The counter-part is that the proofs are much simpler and we obtain more
properties for the optimal and equilibrium paths. Our model is a generalization of
Duran and Le Van (2001) because we allow heterogeneous agents, but as in their
model we constrain gross investment to be non negative (this constraint is not
2imposed in the usual Ramsey model of Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1991), Dana
and Le Van (1991). Intertemporal models with irreversibility, i.e.nonnegative
gross investment, have been studied by Mitra (1983) and Mitra and Ray (1983).
But these papers do not deal with the problem of existence of equilibrium, and
the time horizon is …nite). We emphasize that our paper might be useful for
macroeconomists whowork onheterogeneity anddonot want touse sophisticated
mathematical tools.
As we said before, this strategy allows us to obtain detailed results concern-
ing the properties of competitive equilibria. In particular, we show that in case
where all agents have the same discount factor (i.e. the problem is stationary) the
optimal trajectory converges to a steady state: some ks > 0 which is determined
by the common discount factor. The proof of this result is a simple modi…ca-
tion of existing proofs (e.g. Benhabib and Nishimura, (1985)) and is based on
monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence.
When we allow heterogeneous discount factors proving convergence of the
optimal path is not so simple. The complications arise largely from the fact
that the Pareto-optimum problem is now nonstationary, so it can not have a
steady state. Hence, one cannot conclude that the optimal path is monotonic.
Nevertheless, by exploiting additional properties of optimal paths, we are able to
prove that the optimal capital sequence has a unique accumulation point: some
ks > 0 which is the steady state for the stationary problem in which every agent
has a discount factor equal to the maximum one. In addition to the convergence
result weare able togive apartial characterizationforthe dynamics oftheoptimal
capital sequence. We show that there exists aninteger T (large enough) such that
the optimal sequence (k¤
T+t) either converges decreasingly to ks or it converges to
ks with k¤
T+t ￿ ks for all t ¸ 0:
Finally, using the Inada condition for the instantaneous utility functions, we
show that the consumption paths of all agents with a discount factor equal to
the maximum one converge to strictly positive stationary consumptions while the
consumption paths of the remaining agents converge to zero.
These results are related to the ones obtained by Becker (1980) and Bewley
(1982). Becker also proves that the long-run equilibrium capital stock is deter-
mined by the maximum discount factor while Bewley proves that there exists
some date T such that beyond this date the consumption of the agents with a
discount factor less than the maximum one will be equal to zero (but in his proof
implicitly assumes that the marginal utilities are bounded above).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we set up a simple one sector
3multi-agent economy. Section 3 provides a characterization of the competitive
equilibrium for this economy. Section 4 describes the Pareto-optimum problem
and proves existence of optimal paths. Section 5 analyzes properties of optimal
paths. The existence of a competitive equilibrium is proven in section 6. A
conclusion is given in section 7.
2 The model
We consider an intertemporal one sector model with m ¸ 1 consumers and one





iui(ci;t), where 0 < ¯i < 1 is the discount factor and ci;t denotes the quantity
which agent i consumes at date t. Production possibilities are represented by a
gross production function F and a physical depreciation rate 0 < ± < 1. The
initial endowment of capital, the single reproducible productive factor, is k0 ¸ 0
and #i > 0 is the share owned by consumer i. Obviously,
m P
i=1
#i = 1 and #ik0
is the endowment of consumer i. Consumers also share the pro…t of the …rm in
each period; ®i > 0 is the share owned by consumer i; and
m P
i=1
®i = 1. Formally,
the economy is described by the list,
E = fR1
+; ui;i = 1;::::;m; (®i;#i);i = 1;::::;m; R1
+; k0; F; ±g:
We introduce now some notation. For any initial condition k0 ¸ 0, when k =
(k1;k2;:::::) is such that 0 ￿ (1¡±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ F(kt)+(1¡±)kt for all t, we say
it is feasible from k0 and we denote the set of all feasible accumulation paths by
¦(k0). Let ct = (c1;t; c2;t;::::;cm;t) denote the m¡vector of consumptions of all
agents at date t. A consumption sequence c = (c1;c2;::::) is feasible from k0 ¸ 0
when there exists k 2 ¦(k0) such that 0 ￿
m P
i=1
ci;t ￿ F(kt) + (1¡ ±)kt ¡ kt+1 for
all t. The set of feasible from k0 consumption sequences is denoted by §(k0). We
next specify the properties assumed for the preferences and the technology.
Assumption 1 For i = 1;::::;m; ui : R+ ¡! R is continuous, strictly concave,
strictly increasing and twice di¤erentiable. Moreover, ui(0) = 0 and u0
i(0) = +1.
Assumption 2 The gross production function F : R+ ¡! R+ is continuous,




¯i ¡ 1+ ± and F0(1) = 0.
4If we de…ne the interest rate by r = 1
min
i




that at the origin the marginal productivity of capital is greater than the sum
of interest rate and depreciation rate. Since this sum is the cost of investment,
zero capital stock is not optimal for investment. Moreover, F0(1) = 0 rules out
a sustained growth of the stock of physical capital.
Since F 0 is di¤erentiable and F0(0) > ±; for all k0 > 0 there exists some
0 < k0 ￿ k0 such that F(k0) + (1 ¡ ±)k0 > k0. Hence, for all k0 > 0 there is a





i = F(k0) ¡ ±k0. Further, F0(1) < ± implies the existence of a
maximum sustainable capital stock: some k > 0 for which F(k) + (1 ¡ ±)k <
k i¤ k > k; and F(k) + (1 ¡ ±)k = k. In order to save notation we de…ne




and f0(1) < 1.
3 Characterization of Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this model consists of a sequence (p0;p1;::::) 2
l+
1 nf0g of prices for the consumption good, a price r > 0 for the initial capital
stock, a consumption allocation ci = (ci;0;ci;1;:::::) for each consumer i and a
sequence of capital stocks k = (k1;k2;:::::) such that










ptci;t ￿ #irk0 + ®i¼
where ¼ is the pro…t of the single …rm. The maximum is taken over l+
1.
(b) k yields the maximal pro…t ¼ for the …rm over production plans (k0;k) 2
R+ £ l+





s:t: (1¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0




ci;t + kt+1 = f(kt); 8t ¸ 0:
To prove existence of a competitive equilibrium we follow the Negishi approach:
we …rst study the Pareto-optimal paths and then showthat there exists a Pareto-
optimum the transfer payments of which equal zero. The next section describes
the Pareto-optimum problem and proves existence of optimal paths.
4 The Pareto-optimum problem
4.1 Existence of solutions
Let ¢ =
½





. Given nonnegative welfare weights
¸ = (¸1;::::;¸m) 2 ¢ we maximize a weighted sum of the individual consumers’













ci;t + kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0
(1¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1; 8t ¸ 0









iui(ci;t), where (¸;k;c) 2 ¢£¦(k0)£§(k0): To prove
existence of an optimal path we follow the classical method using continuity of
both ui and f. While the latter will ensure that ¦(k0) and §(k0) are compact
the former will ensure that U is continuous in which case Weirstrass Theorem
applies.
Lemma 1 For all k0 ¸ 0, a) there exists A(k0) such that k 2 ¦(k0) implies
kt ￿ A(k0); 8t; b) ¦(k0) and §(k0) are compact in the product topology, c) 0 ￿
ui(ci;t) ￿ B(k0); 8i;8t; where B(k0) is an upper bound.
Proof: (a) follows for A(k0) = maxfk0;kg; where k is the maximum sustainable
capital stock. Then (b) follows from this bound and Tychonov Theorem, while
(c) is a consequence of 0 ￿ ci;t ￿ f(A(k0)) ￿ A(k0); 8i;8t.





iui(ci;t). Since this sequence is increasing

















Lemma 2 For all k0 ¸ 0; U(¢) is continuous over ¢£¦(k0)£§(k0) with respect
to the relative product topology.
Proof: Consider a sequence (¸n;kn;cn) 2 ¢£ ¦(k0) £ §(k0) that converges to
(¸;k;c) 2 ¢£ ¦(k0)£§(k0): We just have to show that U(¸
n;kn;cn) converges
to U(¸;k;c). Since (¸
n;kn;cn) 2 ¢ £ ¦(k0) £ §(k0) we have kn
t ￿ A(k0) and
0 ￿ cn
i;t ￿ f(A(k0)) ￿ A(k0); 8i;8n. Therefore, 0 ￿ ui(cn

































































For given T; the continuity of ui ensures that there exists N such that for any
n ¸ N the …rst term is smaller than
"
2. Also, since 0 < ¯i < 1 for all i; there









Existence of an optimal path is hence ensured since U(¸;¢;¢) is continuous
over ¦(k0) £ §(k0): Moreover, the assumptions made for both ui and F (strict
concavity) imply that the optimal consumption-accumulation path is unique.
Proposition 1 Forall k0 ¸ 0 there isa unique optimal consumption-accumulation
path.
One way to make the analysis of the behavior of optimal programs easier is
to introduce the concept of a value function. In what follows, for any ¸ 2 ¢;
let I = fi j ¸i > 0g; ¯ = maxf¯i j i 2 Ig; J = fi 2 I j ¯i = ¯g and
I
0 = fi 2 I j i = 2 Jg:
74.2 Value function, Bellman equation
Given any ¸ 2 ¢ and (k;y) such that 0 ￿ y ￿ f(k); we introduce a time-













ci +y ￿ f(k)







s:t: (1¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0
k0 ¸ 0; is given:






s:t: (1¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0
k0 ¸ 0; is given:
Recall that in in…nite-horizon problems with time-invariant period return func-
tions (stationary problems) the value function is a function of the initial state
alone. In the above problem the period return function is time-dependent, so the
problem is a nonstationary one. In this case, as the time index on W indicates,
time becomes a separate argument of the value function.
The next proposition states formally what is known as the Principle of Opti-
mality.
Proposition 2 The value function satis…es the Bellman equation and for all
k0 ¸ 0 a feasible path k is optimal if and only if
Wt(kt) = Vt(¸;kt;kt+1) +¯Wt+1(kt+1)
holds for all t ¸ 0:
8Proof: See Stokey and Lucas (1989, Chapter 4).
If we restrict ourselves to the set of agents with a discount factor equal to the
maximum one, we can de…ne a time-invariant function b V by







ci + y ￿ f(k)
Observe that in this case the associated Pareto-optimum problem is stationary





s:t: (1¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0
k0 ¸ 0; is given:
Using lemma 1 it is easy to check that 8t and 8(k;y) such that 0 ￿ y ￿ f(k);





















< 1 it follows that 8" > 0 there exists
T such that
b V (¸;k;y) ￿ Vt(¸;k;y) ￿ " + b V(¸;k;y); 8t ¸ T:
Moreover, given any k0 ¸ 0; it is easy to check that





















where -(k0) = 1
1¡max
i2I
0¯iC(k0): It follows that for any " > 0 and for all kt feasible
from k0 there exists T such that
9c W(kt) ￿ Wt(kt) ￿ " + c W(kt); 8t ¸ T:
Consider now a feasible capital sequence (kt) starting from some k0 ¸ 0. Using
the previous results, for any subsequence (tn) such that ktn ! k ¸ 0 and ktn+1 !
k0 ¸ 0 we have
lim
n!1
Vtn(¸;ktn;ktn+1) = b V (¸;k;k0) and lim
n!1
Wtn(ktn) = c W(k):
5 Properties of optimal paths
In this section we review important properties of optimal paths. It will turn out
that these properties are very useful for proving existence of a supporting price
system. The main result of this section is Proposition 4, establishing convergence
of the optimal accumulation path in case where agents have di¤erent discount
factors.
Obviously, for any ¸ 2 ¢, an optimal consumption-accumulation path will
depend on ¸: In what follows we suppress ¸ and denote by (c¤;k¤) any optimal
path. The following two lemmas establishthe non-nullity of optimal consumption
and capital sequences and are stated here for further reference.
Lemma 3 Assume k0 > 0 and let (c¤;k¤) denote the solution to the Pareto-
optimum problem. Under assumptions 1 and 2,
a) If ¸i = 0 then c¤





i;t > 0; 8t ¸ 0.
c) If ¸i > 0 then c¤
i;t > 0; 8t ¸ 0:
Proof: See Dana and Le Van (1991, Proposition 3.3, Proposition 3.6).
Lemma 4 Let (c¤;k¤) denote the solution to the Pareto-optimum problem. Un-
der assumptions 1 and 2,
a) if k0 = 0 then k¤
t = 0; c¤
t = 0; 8t ¸ 0:
b) if k0 > 0 then k¤
t > 0; 8t ¸ 0:
Proof: See Dana and Le Van (1991, Proposition 3.6).
10Lemma 5 Let the function Vt(¸;k;y) be de…ned as in section 4.2, i.e. given any













ci + y ￿ f(k):
Under assumptions 1 and 2,













i); 8i 2 I:
b) If 0 < y < f(k) then @2Vt
@k@y > 0:
c) If ¯i = ¯ for all i 2 I and k¤ is an optimal path starting from some k0 ¸ 0;
then k¤ is monotone. Moreover, if k0 ￿ k0
0 and k¤;k
0
are optimal paths starting
respectively from k0 and k0
0; then k¤
t ￿ k0
t; 8t ¸ 0:
Proof: a) Let c¤
i = (c¤
1;:::::;c¤
l )l￿m denote a solution for the maximization prob-
lem. Notice that if we let ci = "
#I for all i 2 I; where " > 0 is choosen such
that " + y < f(k); the Slater condition is veri…ed. Hence, there exists a multi-
plier ¹t 2 R such that (c¤
i;¹t) maximizes the associated Lagrangian. The Kuhn








i) = ¹t; 8i 2 I














i +y = f(k): Moreover, the strict concavity of ui and
f implies that the solution c¤
i = (c¤
1:::::c¤
l)l￿m is unique. Hence, ¹t is unique. If
we de…ne f(k)¡y = ®; it can be easily shown (see Corollary 7.3.1 in Florenzano,
LeVan and Gourdel, 2001) that
@Vt(¸;k;y)































i + y¡ f(k) = 0:
















i +@y ¡ f0(k)@k = 0:
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x1 + :::: +xl = 0:



































































12The last equation implies that
@¹t











c) If k0 = 0 then Lemma 4 implies that k¤
t = 0; 8t: Assume that k0 > 0: Since
we have shown that @2b V
@k@y > 0; one may use (sligtly adapted since in our model
investment is irreversible) the proof in Benhabib and Nishimura (1985, Theorem
2, pp 293-295).
Since in our model investment is irreversible i.e. (1 ¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1; 8t; we
face the possibility this constraint being binding at certain periods. However, as
the following lemma establishes, the constraint cannot be always binding in the
long-run.
Lemma 6 Let k0 > 0: If k¤ is an optimal path starting from k0 there cannot be
an integer T such that (1 ¡ ±)k¤
t = k¤
t+1 for all t ¸ T:
Proof: See Appendix.
An immediate consequence of the last lemma is that it allows us to prove that
an optimal sequence k¤ cannot converge to zero.




Let us now consider the Pareto-optimum problem involving only agents in J:
The next result shows that in this case the optimal capital sequence converges
monotonically to a steady state.
Proposition 3 Let k¤ denote the opimal trajectory for the Pareto-optimum prob-
lem involving only agents in J: There is some ks > 0 with f(ks) ¡ ks > 0 and
¯f0(ks) = 1 such that for all k0 > 0; k¤
t ! ks:
Proof: Lemma 1 together with the monotonicity of optimal paths (Lemma 5c)
imply that k¤
t ! ks ¸ 0: However, Lemma 7 established that k¤
t can not converge
to zero. Hence, ks > 0: By the principle of optimality
c W(k¤
t) = b V(¸;k¤
t;k¤
t+1)+ ¯c W(k¤
t+1); 8t ¸ 0:









there exists some j 2 J such that c¤












> 0; 8i;j 2 J:
Thus, if c¤
i;t ¡! 0 for some i 2 J; then c¤
j;t ¡! 0; 8j 2 J: a contradiction. Hence,
c¤
i > 0; 8i 2 J:
Since k¤
t ! ks > 0 there exists T such that (1¡±)k¤
t < k¤
t+1 < f(k¤
t); 8t ¸ T.





















t+1); 8i 2 J:
Taking the limits in Euler equation gives ¯f0(ks) = 1:
The following lemma implies that there cannot be a subsequence (tn) such
that k¤
tn ! 0: It will turn out that this property is crucial in order to prove
convergence of the optimal path in case where agents have di¤erent discount
factors.
Lemma 8 For any k0 > 0 and k¤ optimal from k0 there exists ° > 0 such that
k¤
t ¸ °; 8t ¸ 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
The next result allows for heterogeneous discount factors and uses the above
properties, specially Lemma 8, to prove convergence of the optimal capital se-
quence.
Proposition 4 Let k0 > 0: If k¤ denotes an optimal path starting from k0; then
k¤
t ! ks; where ks is determined by ¯f0(ks) = 1:
Proof: If ¯i = ¯ for every i; then it follows from Proposition 3 that the optimal
path converges to ks with ¯f0(ks) = 1: Consider now the case where there exists i
with ¯i < ¯: Assume that there exists an integer T such that the sequence (k¤
t+T)
14is monotonic. In this case, Lemma 1 and Lemma 7 imply that k¤
t+T ! k > 0. By





t+T+1); 8t ¸ 0:
Taking the limits we obtain
c W(k) = b V (¸;k;k) +¯c W(k):
Ifk satis…es theabove equation Proposition3impliesthatk = ks;where ¯f0(ks) =
1.









t+1: In this case there exist
































; 8k 2 N:
Let k0 > 0 and without loss of generality assume that T1 < T
0
1 and k0 > k¤
T1:
This case is depicted in Fgure 1. Since (k¤
t) is bounded it has an accumulation




tn = k: Observe that 8n there exist Tkn;T
0














Consider now an eventual subsequence of (k¤








for all m and k¤








































Taking the limits we get
c W(k
00
min) = b V (¸;k
00
min;kmin) +¯c W(kmin)





This means that for the stationary optimal problem associated with the value
function c W; k
0







Tkm for all m; we have k
0
min ¸ kmin and k
00
min ¸ kmin:
15By Lemma 5 (see the statement c), k
00





min = kmin which in turn implies that either kmin = 0 or kmin = ks with
¯f0(ks) = 1 (see Proposition 3). But kmin = 0 is ruled out by Lemma 8 and
since k¤
Tkm ￿ k¤
tm we have ks ￿ k: Following a similar argument one can easily





we have ks ¸ k: Combining the two
results we obtain ks = k:
Consider now an eventual subsequence of (k¤








for all m and k¤





















max: Following the same reasoning
as beforeone can provethat ks = k: Summing upwe haveproved that theoptimal
sequence (k¤
t) has a unique accumulation point ks determined by ¯f0(ks) = 1
Thus, (k¤
t) must converge to ks with ¯f0(ks) = 1:
We now show that if we allow for heterogeneous discount factors the limit of
the optimal capital sequence is not a steady state.
Proposition 5 2If there exists i 2 I such that ¯i < ¯ then ks determined by
¯f0(ks) = 1 is not a steady state.
Proof: Let k0 = ks andassumethat k¤
t = ks; 8t ¸ 1. Since(1¡±)ks < ks < f(ks)












































s); 8i 2 I:













But in this case c¤
i;t+1 < c¤
i;t; 8i 2 I
0 while c¤
i;t+1 = c¤








i;t; 8t; contradicting the optimality of k¤
t = ks for all t:
2This proposition was suggested to us by Tapan Mitra.
16Remark 1 The above proposition implies that in case where agents have di¤erent
discount factors and the economy starts at k0 = ks any optimal path (k¤
t) con-
verges to ks with k¤
1 6= ks. As a result, the optimal path may exhibit ‡uctuations
at least for the beginning periods.
We can now show that the Euler equation do hold from some period on.
Proposition 6 If k0 > 0 and k¤ is an optimal path starting from k0; there exists
T such that (1 ¡ ±)k¤
t < k¤
t+1 < f(k¤
t); 8t ¸ T.
Proof: Since k¤
t ! ks > 0, the result follows immediatelly.
The next result provides a partial characterization for the dynamics of the
optimal capital sequence.
Proposition 7 Let k¤ denote the optimal capital sequence starting from some
k0 > 0: There exists T such that (k¤
T+t) either converges decreasingly to ks or it
converges to ks with k¤
T+t ￿ ks; 8t ¸ 0:
Proof: Choose T such that for all t ¸ T ¡ 1 the Euler equation holds:
i) Assume that k¤





























T); 8i 2 J:
Since k¤
T > ks; ¯if
0
(k¤
T) < 1 and ¯f
0
(k¤
T) < 1: From the Euler equations we
have c¤
i;T¡1 > c¤






















T+1: Let T1 > T be




T1 (this date exists since (k¤
t)













T1: a contradiction. As a result we conclude
that (k¤
T+t) converges decreasingly to ks:
ii) Assume that k¤



















T1: a contradiction. As
a result (k¤
T+t) converges to ks with k¤
T+t ￿ ks for all t:
17Remark 2 Proposition 7 implies that the optimal capital sequence cannot ‡uc-
tuate around the steady state in the long run (no-crossing property). For T large
enough the optimal capital sequence either converges decreasingly to ks or if it
crosses ks it remains below it.
The next proposition shows that the consumption path of the agents with
a discount factor equal to the maximum one converges to a strictly positive
stationary consumption, while the consumption path of the remaining agents
converges to zero.
Proposition 8 Let c¤ denote the optimal consumption path. Then,
a) c¤
i;t converges to zero, 8i 2 I0:
b) c¤
i;t converges to some c¤
i > 0, 8i 2 J.





























> 1 we must have c¤
i;t ! 0; 8i 2 I0:








i = f(ks) ¡ ks > 0. Since
c¤
i;t ! 0; 8i 2 I
0; there must exist some j 2 J such that c¤












> 0; 8i;j 2 J:
Thus if c¤
i;t ¡! 0 for some i 2 J; then c¤
j;t ¡! 0; 8j 2 J: a contradiction. Hence
c¤
i > 0; 8i 2 J:
6 Existence of a competitive equilibrium
In this section we want to prove:
i) with the optimal path c¤(¸);k¤(¸) one can associate a sequence of prices
p(¸) de…ned as pt(¸) = ¯
t¹t for all t and a price r(¸) = p0(¸)F
0
(k0) of the initial
stock such that (c¤(¸);k¤(¸);p(¸);r(¸)) is a price equilibrium with transfers,
ii) there exists a set of welfare weights such that these transfers equal to zero.
As in the previous section we suppress ¸ wherever it is possible.
18Lemma 9 The sequence of prices p(¸); de…ned as pt(¸) = ¯
t¹t for all t; is a
sequence which belongs to l+
1 nf0g:
Proof: Take j 2 J. Since c¤
j;t > 0; 8t and c¤
j;t ! c¤
j > 0; there exists a > 0 such
that c¤





















Theorem 1 Let k0 > 0: Then c¤(¸);k¤(¸) optimal from k0; p(¸) de…ned as
pt(¸) = ¯
t¹t for all t, and r(¸) = p0(¸)F
0
(k0) isa price equilibrium with transfers.
Proof: An allocation c¤(¸);k¤(¸); a price sequence p(¸) 2 l
+
1 nf0g for the con-
sumption good, and a price r(¸) for the initial capital stock constitute a price
equilibrium with transfers if



















pt(¸)[f(kt) ¡kt+1] ¡ r(¸)k0
s:t: (1 ¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t ¸ 0:







t); 8t ¸ 0:
19Theconcavity of the instantaneous utility functionui implies that c¤
i(¸) solves
the consumer’s problem. It only remains toprove thatthe production planindeed
solves the …rm’s problem.












s:t: (1 ¡ ±)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ f(kt); 8t = 0;:::::;T
kT+1 = k¤
T+1
By lemma 3, k¤
T+1 < f(k¤
T); so the Slater condition is veri…ed. Hence, there are
multipliers½t;°t 2 R associatedwiththeabove constraintssuchthat (k¤
t;½t;°t)T
t=0
maximizes the associated Lagrangian. By Lemma 3, °t = 0 for all t = 0,....,T.











+½t ¡ ½t+1(1¡ ±) = 0




















For any k(¸) 2 ¦(k0) and any T

































0;k(¸)) ¸0: Using the concavity of f and rear-




















































































































Since the Euler equation holds for t ¸ T, the terms between T and T
0 vanish.











+ [¡½0+ ½1(1¡ ±)](k¤
1 ¡ k1)





+ [¡½T¡2+ ½T¡1(1 ¡ ±)](k¤
T¡1 ¡ kT¡1)
























T] + ½T¡1[kT ¡ (1¡ ±)kT¡1]
+ ½T[(1¡ ±)k
¤
T ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kT]:
Since ½t[(1 ¡ ±)k¤
t ¡ k¤
























+ ½0(1¡ ±)k0¡ ½0k
¤





























0+1 are bounded from above while ¯T
0
¡! 0 as T
0 ¡! 1: Then,
'(1;k(¸)) ¸0 as was to be shown.
The appropriate transfer to each consumer is the amount that just allows the
consumer to a¤ord the consumption stream allocated by the social optimization












A competitive equilibrium for this economy corresponds to a set of welfare
weights ¸ 2 ¢ such that these transfers equal to zero. The next two lemmas will
allow us to use a …xed point argument to prove that such a ¸ exists.
Lemma 10 For every i; ©i(¢) is a continuous function of ¸:
Proof: Lemma 2 shows that, given ¸ 2 ¢; U(¸;c;k) is continuous over ¦(k0)£
§(k0): Since¦(k0) and§(k0) are compact adirect applicationof Berge’s Theorem
impliesthat c¤(¸) andk¤(¸) arecontinuous functions of¸ inthe producttopology.















































i;t(¸); 8t;8i = 1;:::;m
22(because if i = 2 I; c¤
i;t(¸) = 0; 8t):













where D(k0) = (#I)B(k0):
Consider a sequence ¸n 2 ¢ that converves to ¸ 2 ¢. We want to show that
©i(¸























































for some i 2 I: Since c¤
i;t(¸
n) converges to c¤





























3: Moreover, given T; the continuity of pt(¸) and c¤
i;t(¸) im-
plies that there exists N such that for any n ¸ N the …rst term is smaller than
"




i;t(¸) is continuous with respect to ¸:













Following the same reasoning it can be easily shown that pt(¸)[f(k¤
t(¸))¡k¤
t+1(¸)]










it follows that r(¸) is also a continuous function of ¸: As a result, for any i;
®i¼(¸) + #ir(¸)k0 is continuous with respect to ¸:
Lemma 11 Let k0 > 0: Then, for any ¸ 2 ¢; ¼(¸) > 0:
Proof: Take the feasible sequence k de…ned by (1 ¡ ±)kt = kt+1; 8t ¸ 1: Since









> p0(¸)[F(k0) ¡ F
0
(k0)k0] > 0:
Theorem 2 Let k0 > 0: Under the assumptions made about the preferences and
the technology there exists ¸ 2 ¢ such that ©i(¸) = 0; 8i; i.e. there exists an
equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is a direct application of Brouwer’s …xed point theorem. Let













i(¸) = ¡©i(¸) if ©i(¸) < 0 and ©
0
i(¸) = 0 if ©i(¸) ¸ 0: T is a continuous
mapping from the simplex into itself. By the Brouwer …xed point theorem there



















If ¸i = 0; Lemma 3 implies c¤
i;t(¸) = 0 for all t; so we have ©i(¸) < 0 and
©
0





i(¸) > 0 then
©
0
i(¸) > 0; 8i: From the de…nition of ©
0
i(¸) this implies ©i(¸) < 0; 8i: But this
contradicts Walras’ Law which says
m P
i=1





i(¸) = 0 which
implies ©
0
i(¸) = 0; 8i: But in this case we have ©i(¸) ¸ 0; 8i: From Walras’ Law
we have ©i(¸) = 0; 8i:
247 Conclusions
This paper proves existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ram-
sey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and investment is irre-
versible. The analysis is carriedout by exploiting the link between Pareto-optima
and competitive equilibria (Negishi method). This method allows us to obtain
detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria, with most
important the convergence of the optimal capital trajectory to a limit point:
some ks > 0 determined by the maximum discount factor. In contrast to the
traditional one sector growth model, our proof of convergence does not rely on
the monototnicity property simply because such a property does not exist if one
allows di¤erent discount factors. In addition to the convergence result we are
able to give a partial characterization for the dynamics of the optimal capital
sequence: in the long-run the optimal capital trajectory exhibits a “no-crossing”
property in the sense that it cannot ‡uctuate around the steady state. Finally,
using the Inada condition for the instantaneous utility functions, we are able to
show that the consumption paths of all agents with a discount factor equal to
the maximum one converge to strictly positive stationary consumptions, while
the consumption paths of the remaining agents converge to zero.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 6: Let k0 > 0 but assume that such T exists. Since k¤
t ¡! 0
we can choose some integer T





¯i ¡ 1 +±. Lemma
3 implies that k¤
t+1 < F(k¤
t) + (1¡ ±)k¤













be an alternative accumulation path de…ned as k
0
t = k¤





t(1 + ") for t ¸ T
0
+ 1: Up to date T
0
+ 1 the path k
0
is feasible in
regard of the choice of ": For t ¸ T
0 + 2 we have,
(1¡ ±)k
0
t = (1¡ ±)(1+ ")k
¤





where the second equality holds because (1¡±)k¤
t = k¤












0 is feasible. We next show that k
0 dominates k¤ for some " > 0 small




























































































































































i;t): Using the concavity








































































































0+1); 8i 2 I: Similarly, for t > T
0
+ 1; the





















0+1; 8t > T
0
+ 1: Thus k
0





















































0+1); 8t > T
0
+ 1:



























































































































































































































Subtracting and using the concavity of f we get
f(k¤
T















































































































i ¯i > 1¡ min


























In short '(0) = 0 and '(") > 0 for " > 0 small enough: a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 7: Assume the contrary: k0 > 0 and k¤ is optimal but
k¤
t ¡! 0. The rest of the proof follows in two steps.
Step 1: We claim that there is some T with (1 ¡ ±)k¤
t < k¤
t+1 for all t ¸ T:
Suppose the claim is false. Then for any integer T there exists T





0: Note that lemma 6 implies that T
0 can be choosen such




0+1. Moreover, since k¤
t ¡! 0; T







¯i ¡ 1+ ±:




0¡1); so we can choose " > 0 small enough such that
k¤
T
0 +" < f(k¤
T
0¡1) and (1¡ ±)(k¤
T
0 +") < k¤
T


























is feasible. We next show that k
0




























































































































































































































































0): In short '(0) = 0 and '(") > 0 for " > 0 small
enough: a contradiction.






















































t+1); 8i 2 I:
If k¤
t ¡! 0 there exists T
0

















i;t+1); 8t ¸ T
0
: But in this case
c¤
i;t < c¤
i;t+1; 8t ¸ T
0
and in particular c¤
i;t > c¤
i;T




t ¡! 0 implies c¤
i;t ¡! 0 by feasibility: a contradiction.




¯i: We consider two cases:
Case 1: Assume k0 > ®: In this case we show that k¤
t ¸ ® for all t; so we let
° = ®:
Assume the contrary and denote by t0 the …rst date such that k¤
t0 < ® ￿ k¤
t0¡1:
The rest of the proof follows in two steps.
Step 1: We claimthat thereexists T suchthat k¤





t0+T+1: To prove this we proceed by induction. If k¤
t0+1 ¸ k¤
t0 we let
T = 0. If not we have k¤
t0+1 < k¤
t0: In the same way, if k¤
t0+2 ¸ k¤
t0+1 we let T = 1.
If not we have k¤
t0+2 < k¤
t0+1 and so on.
Observe that ifk¤
t0+T+1 < k¤










30Taking the limits we get
c W(k) = b V (¸;k;k) + ¯c W(k)
If k satis…es the above equation Proposition 3 implies that k = ks with ¯f0(ks) =
1: But ks < ®; so we have 1
¯ = f0(ks) > f0(®) = 1
min
i
¯i: a contradiction. Thus
there exists T such that k¤





Step 2: For simplicity denote T0 = t0+T. Step 1 established that there exists
T0 such that k¤





















Consider now an alternative capital path de…ned by k
0




T0 +": Note that " can be choosen such that k
0 is feasible i.e.
(1 ¡ ±)k¤
T0¡1 < k¤







We now show that k











































































































































¯i = f0(®) < f0(k¤
T0); so we have ¹T0¡1 < ¯¹T0f
0(k¤
T0):
Case 2: 0 < k0 ￿ ®. In this case we distinguish between two subcases.
a) Let 0 < k0 ￿ ® but assume that there exists t0 such that k¤
t0 ¸ ®:
Repeating the argument applied in case 1 one can show that k¤
t ¸ ®; 8t ¸ t0; so







b) Let 0 < k0 ￿ ® but assume k¤
t < ®; 8t: We show that k¤
t ¸ k0; 8t; and in
that case we let ° = k0:
Assume that k¤






T0+1: If the claim is false, then one can show (see
step 1 in case 1) that k¤
t converges decreasingly to ks. Since ks < ®; we have
1




¯i : a contradiction.









T0 +": One can show (see step 2 in case 1) that, for proper choice of
"; k
0 is feasible and dominates k¤: But this contradicts the optimality of k¤, so
we must have k¤
1 ¸ k0: Applying the same reasoning one can show that k¤
2 ¸ k¤
1:
Continuing in that way one can establish that k¤
t is increasing and therefore
k¤
t ¸ k0; 8t:
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